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Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and 
Navigation Between Brazil and the U.S. 
Prof. Dr. Attila S.L. Andrade Jr.* 
This Article deals with the analytical history of the 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the U.S. 
and Brazil. In the first part of the Article, the author ana-
lyzed all the provisions of the Treaty entered into between 
the two countries on December 12, 1828. The second part 
examined the historical causes for the early termination of 
the Treaty, 13 years after its execution. It suggests and evi-
dences that the historical cause lies in a political factor, that 
is, the conflicts between a Republican form of government 
and the Brazilian Imperial political system. The third and 
final part of the Article deals with the economic history of 
investments and business between the two countries. It final-
izes to suggest the economic losses to both countries in the 
absence of a new Treaty in force. It also makes an exhorta-
tion to both countries to enter into a new Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce and Navigation.  
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One of the most intriguing facts in the history of international 
law is the existence (or the non-existence) of the Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce and Navigation between Brazil and the United States.1 It 
is hard to believe that the most powerful economies in the Americas 
(the first and the eighth largest economies on earth) do not seem to 
possess a treaty to govern their relationship on trade and navigation.2 
The main purpose of this article is to analyze the history of this treaty 
between the two countries. It will also speculate on what has hap-
pened to this treaty and the consequences of it going into oblivion. 
I.  THE HISTORY 
The U.S. and Brazil entered into a treaty on Amity, Commerce, 
and Navigation on December 12, 1828.3 It was one of the very first 
treaties that the two young nations entered into. This treaty involved 
the Republic of the United States of America and the Empire of Bra-
zil; it was actually signed by “His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil” 
Pedro (Peter) the Second.4 
Article 1 declared the firm and stable bonds of friendship be-
tween the two countries and their respective citizens.5 It was more a 
declaration of intents and a philosophical brooding than an actual 
rule of law. 
                                                                                                             
 
 1 For a list of treaties and other international agreements between the U.S. 
and Brazil, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, 29 (2010), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=KDOb9eh2ldUC&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&d
q=%228+Stat.+390%22&source=bl&ots=GNCdg_Ae7m&sig=Gpfebvper-
jjE6o4DBD-
mmKGHaCs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi31KDj_bvMAh-
WCKx4KHRyQAsUQ6AEIJzAD#v=onep-
age&q=%228%20Stat.%20390%22&f=false. 
 2 Id.; World’s Largest Economies, CNN MONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/ (last visited May 
1, 2016). 
 3 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Braz., Dec. 12, 1828, 8 
Stat. 390, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/brazil01.asp 
[hereinafter Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at art. I. 
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Article 2 established a principle of equality whereby neither 
country would grant concessions on trade and navigation to third 
parties without warranting the same privileges to each other.6 The 
Empire of Brazil at the time made exceptions to existing treaties and 
understandings with Portugal.7 
Article 3 gave the citizens of both countries the freedom to un-
dertake trade, business, and residence in either nation.8 Exception to 
this rule was made for coastal trading in either country subject to its 
domestic or local laws.9  It is interesting to note that had this Treaty 
remained in force, both Brazilians and Americans would have had 
preferential rights to permanent residence visa applications in their 
respective countries. In the U.S. for instance, this right would have 
been warranted within the category of the E-1 Trade Treaty Visas 
application requirements.10 
Article 4 regulated freedom of navigation in the sense that the 
vessels of foreign countries, as well as U.S. and Brazilian vessels, 
were free to carry merchandise, produce and manufactured items of 
either country; they also were free to export into each other’s terri-
tories irrespective of any special levies, duties, or  tonnage of the 
cargo or its nature.11 This rule would also be applied to exportation 
and re-exportation from one country to the other.12 The end of the 
article explained what it meant for a vessel to be “Brazilian.”13 Ac-
cordingly, for the vessel to be “Brazilian,” it would have sufficed 
that the owner or the captain of the ship be Brazilian and the papers 
be legally in order.14 It was indeed the first attempt to regulate the 
                                                                                                             
 6 Id. at art. II. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at art. III. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Nonimmigrant Treaty Traders and Investors and Immigrant Employment-
Based Alien Entrepreneurs, Overview, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20Room/Customer%2
0Service%20Reference%20Guide/TradersInvestors.pdf (last visited May 1, 
2016). 
 11 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, supra note 3, at art. IV. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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freedom of the seas between the two countries and liberate them 
from the bonds of taxation. 
Article 5 provided for a rule of tax equality and non-discrimina-
tion on taxation—it established that there should have been no 
higher taxation on the export of either Brazilian or U.S. products.15 
Moreover, the taxes on the export of Brazilian and American goods 
could not have been more onerous than the taxes levied on the sim-
ilar products to third party countries.16 Likewise there should have 
been no prohibition of exportation or importation of products into 
either country, a policy that did not exist for third party countries.17 
In sum, no discrimination of any sort may have existed whether in 
taxation or in foreign trade. 
Article 6 regulated the equality of citizen’s rights concerning 
captains’ and merchants’ prerogatives in each country’s ports con-
cerning the loading and un-loading of cargo and the consignment 
and sale of their goods.18 Each country’s captains and merchants 
were to be treated in the same way as the country’s own citizens or 
itsmost favored nation’s status.19 One may assume that in the case 
where the domestic law would have treated its own citizenry poorly 
concerning those activities, the treaty may have afforded a treatment 
according to the most favored nation.20 
Article 7 dealt with a no embargo rule in a case of military ex-
pedition or action.21 If the embargo was unavoidable, it required ad-
equate indemnification be paid to the prejudiced party.22 This seems 
an old concept dear to both civil and common laws whereby there is 
“no expropriation without compensation.”23 
Article 8 provided for the well being of the captain and the rest 
of the crew of the vessels, whether merchant or military, in case of 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. at art. V. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at art. VI. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at art. VII. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Javier Robalino-Orellana, International Investment And Administrative 
Law In Latin America, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW PROCEEDINGS 465, 467 (2007). 
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wars or any extraordinary event.24 Accordingly, it would have al-
lowed them to seek refuge or asylum in the rivers, bays, and ports in 
either country and be treated with respect and humanity.25 
Article 9 reflected an interesting provision providing that after 
acts of piracy, the owners of the cargo be able to claim compensation 
for deprivation of its ownership before the proper tribunal.26 Imag-
ine the impact that this Article would have had if a similar treaty 
existed between the U.S. and Cuba in the famous case of Banco 
Nacional de Cuba vs Sabbatino.27 
Article 10 ruled on the captain’s and crew’s right to be assisted 
in cases where vessels are wrecked.28 It also provided for the cap-
tain’s right to jettison the cargo if the vessel was in peril of sinking.29 
It is an old principle in maritime law known as “general average.”30 
Article 11 provided rules of civil rights concerning the captain 
and other members of the crew to dispose of its own assets by sale, 
donation, will, or testament.31 
Article 12 contained a similar rule, extending to each country’s 
citizenry the right to the full protection of the laws of each country.32 
This article was amply interpreted to include all respective citizens, 
transients, or people permanently residing in each territory. 
Article 13 assured freedom of conscience and of religion to the 
citizens of each country in its respective jurisdiction.33 It also pro-
vided that in case of death, burial proceedings be observed in ac-
cordance with local usage and in appropriate places free from dis-
turbance and molestation.34 
Article 14 sheltered an intriguing principle that would most 
likely be rejected during today’s world affairs and developments of 
international law. It provided full liberty for the vessels of either 
                                                                                                             
 24 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, supra note 3, at art. VIII. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at art. XI, 
 27 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 28 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, supra note 3, at art. X. 
 29 Id. 
 30 General Average Definition, DUHAIME.ORG, http://www.duhaime.org/Le-
galDictionary/G/GeneralAverage.aspx (last visited May 1, 2016). 
 31 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, supra note 3, at art. XI. 
 32 Id. at art. XII. 
 33 Id. at art. XIII. 
 34 Id. 
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contracting party to sail and engage in business with the vessels of 
the enemy of either country.35 It seems that, at the time, freedom of 
the seas and trade prevailed over good common sense during war-
time. Imagine a situation in which a Brazilian vessel was not a party 
to or ally of either the U.S. or Spain during the Spanish-American 
War. The Brazilian vessel could have engaged in business with a 
Spanish flag vessel in any nearby territory of the U.S. Or even 
worse, imagine a Brazilian vessel (before Brazil entered WWII on 
the side of the Allies) doing business in a Brazilian port for German 
U-boats to later torpedo American and British ships. It is a principle 
of law which would not be approved in modern days given the mo-
rality of “friendly nations” during times of war. The neutrality con-
cept of a friendly nation would have been imposed and would have 
superseded any other economic consideration, which would other-
wise support the very concept of free trade and freedom of the seas. 
Article 15 embodied a consequential rule of the preceding arti-
cle. It provided that if the properties of a neutral flagship (being one 
of the treaty parties thereof) were found in the enemy’s vessel, such 
properties would be deemed enemy properties and therefore be sub-
ject to confiscation.36 This would be the case unless the properties 
had been placed aboard the enemy’s ship before the declaration of 
war between the enemy country and one of the contracting parties.37 
Article 16 reinforced the rule of Article 14 emphasizing the free-
dom of trade and the seas except in the following cases of trans-
ported goods: 
1st. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunder-
busses, muskets, fuzees, rifles, carbines, pistols, 
pikes, swords, sabres, lances, spears, halberds and 
grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls and all 
other things belonging to the use of these arms. 
2d. Bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of mail, in-
fantry belts and clothes made up in the form and for 
a military use. 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. at art. XIV. 
 36 Id. at art. XV. 
 37 Id. 
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3d. Cavalry belts, and horses with their furniture. 
4th. And generally all kinds of arms and instruments 
of iron, steel, brass and copper or of any other. 
Of course the list of these items does not make much sense in 
today’s warfare considering that this treaty is from the first quarter 
of the XIX century.38 
Article 17 restated the right to free trade and freedom of the seas 
except in cases of contraband and the items previously described.39 
It also denied freedom of navigation and trade in ports where an or-
der of blockade existed.40 
Article 18 established that articles of contraband found on a ves-
sel of either of the contracting parties bound for an enemy port 
would be subject to detention and confiscation.41 
Article 19 provided that a vessel that was destined for an enemy 
port subject to besiege or a blockade may be entitled to turn around 
without having its cargo detained and confiscated (if its goods were 
not contraband).42 Imagine if this treaty were in force and a Brazilian 
ship carrying bags of coffee with all documents in order sailed to 
Cuba during the 1964 U.S. blockade to the island. Upon notice, the 
Brazilian vessel would have been entitled to turn away from its orig-
inal destination. In this case, the U.S. authorities would not have 
been able to detain and confiscate the cargo as the vessel would not 
have defied or challenged the blockade. The same rule would apply 
to today’s world. 
Article 20 disposed of formalities in the examination of the neu-
tral ship, and it provided that the naval authorities of one country 
would be entitled to examine documents and paperwork in an or-
derly fashion. 43 It was recommended that the examining authorities 
should not require the other vessel’s personnel to leave its own ship 
to evidence its paperwork related to the cargo. The article recom-
mended naval inspectors’ courtesy and appropriateness.44 
                                                                                                             
 38 Id. at art. XVI. 
 39 Id. at art. XVII. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at art. XVIII. 
 42 Id. at art. XIX. 
 43 Id. at art. XX. 
 44 Id. 
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Article 21 provided further details to avoid vexation and disor-
der during the examination process by indicating that crewmembers 
should carry sea letters and passports and any other documents to 
identify the personnel and the ship cargo.45 
Article 22 brought a rule of chivalry from almost two centuries 
ago that apparently laid dormant in the distant past. It said that if the 
vessels were in convoy, the word of honor of the convoy commander 
would suffice and supersede the need for the inspection.46 What a 
world these people lived in! 
Article 23 provided for procedural rules pursuant to which the 
competent tribunal would deliver its sentence concerning the vessel, 
the merchandise, and the crew.47 Additionally, it bound the other 
contracting party concerning the same.48 The tribunal would extract 
copies of its award.49 
Article 24 provided that as a contracting party at war, no citizen 
of the other party to the treaty would be required or obligated to 
accept a commission or a letter of marque in order to resist or coop-
erate with the enemy of that treaty party at war.50 Conversely, such 
a person would be deemed a pirate. 
Article 25 contained another rule of chivalry that no longer ex-
ists in today’s world. It provided that if (and “God forbid,” as the 
treaty phrased) the two contracting parties were at war with each 
other, citizens of either country would be afforded a free pass for 
themselves and their property for either six months for those dwell-
ing along the coast or for one year for those residing in the interior 
of the territory of each country.51 Compared with today’s world, one 
may conclude that the citizens of any country at war would be im-
mediately taken to a concentration camp and their property confis-
cated as a war effort. 
Article 26 said that in the event of war between the two contract-
ing parties, no debt, credit, funds, moneys, commercial papers, or 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. at art. XXI. 
 46 Id. at art. XXII. 
 47 Id. at art. XXIII. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at art. XXIV. 
 51 Id. at art. XXV. 
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riches pertaining to the citizens of either country would be confis-
cated.52 What a fascinating world! 
Article 27 gave, during times of eventual war, full protection and 
immunity to the contracting parties’ diplomats, envoys, and minis-
ters in order to warrant equality and fairness of public communica-
tions.53 
Article 28 provided that, in order to give more effectiveness and 
protection to the rights of the citizens of either country under this 
treaty, the contracting parties agreed to admit consuls and vice con-
suls to be appointed to the cities of respective ports open to foreign 
commerce.54 Such diplomatic agents would enjoy the same rights, 
privileges, and prerogatives of consuls and vice consuls of the most 
favored nation.55 
Article 29 required these appointed consuls and vice consuls to 
present their patents and formal assignment letters to the authorities 
of the other country before they entered into their functions.56 
Article 30 provided for full diplomatic immunity and tax-free 
status to the parties’ respective government agents and authorities.57 
It also guaranteed that their places of residence and belongings 
would be inviolable and exempted from court orders to the con-
trary.58 
Article 31 established that the consuls would have the power to 
request to the proper courts the detention and arrest of any deserter 
aboard the vessel of its own country.59 The article did not specify 
the circumstances of the court request for arrest so one may surmise 
that it would have been during times of war and peace.60 
Article 32 declared that the two countries would endeavor to 
form consular convention in order to better define the rights and pre-
rogatives of their respective consular and vice consular authorities 
to act within the framework of this treaty.61 
                                                                                                             
 52 Id. at art. XXVI. 
 53 Id. at art. XXVII. 
 54 Id. at art. XXVIII. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at art. XXIX. 
 57 Id. at art. XXX. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at art. XXXI. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at art. XXXII. 
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Article 33 ended the treaty rules by establishing that the treaty 
was to be in force for twelve years.62 After one year, either party 
thereto would have had the right to terminate the treaty.63 In case of 
termination, this article provided that the treaty would only have 
been terminated with reference to the provisions on trade and navi-
gation.64 Insofar as friendship, Article 33 provided that the treaty 
provisions would have remained.65 
On December 12, 1841, by a notice given from the Emperor of 
Brazil, this treaty was terminated “only for articles relating to com-
merce and navigation.”66 
II. SPECULATIONS ON WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED TO THE TREATY 
Why did the Emperor of Brazil terminate the treaty 
with the U.S. just 13 years after entering it into force? 
The history of mankind is the history of the pursuit of riches and 
power—the “two Siamese brothers”—as one cannot live without the 
other. The history of the nations does not escape this assertion. The 
treaties themselves are a conciliation of these interests so that the 
nations could accommodate their goals for wealth and power with-
out strives and wars. The history of the Treaties on Amity, Com-
merce, and Navigation represents this eternal conflict between and 
among the nations of the world and their attempts to accommodate 
their controversial goals without going to war. 
In order to understand the history of this treaty and its failure, 
one must understand the background history of the two young na-
tions back in 1828. Although their history has similarities, it also 
possesses a great many dissimilarities. Both were young, energetic, 
large territorial countries with immense riches. Both have had a 
large presence of immigrants from all over the world and the pres-
ence of non-white indigenous populations (Indians) and the unfor-
tunate migration of Africans as slaves. However, the similarities fin-
ish there. All the rest has been different. While the U.S. conquered 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. at art. XXXIII. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
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its independence in 1776 after long years of bloody war waged 
against Great Britain, its colonial power Brazil basically “earned” 
its independence most peacefully.67 Its independence was the out-
come of an accord between son (Pedro I of Brazil) and father (King 
John VI of Portugal), which resulted in the declaration of Brazilian 
independence in 1822.68 There was no war, conflict, or animosity 
between the colonial power and the colonists in Brazil.69 Thus, a 
smooth transition from an Imperial Portuguese nation to a new and 
independent Imperial Brazilian nation occurred.70 It seems that there 
was conciliation, such as “you become independent but keep the 
same imperial nature of government as us.” 71  It was almost like a 
father-son arrangement, an amicable arrangement that has lasted for 
many years. 
In the U.S. from the very beginning of its history, there was ab-
horrence against monarchical forms of government as Great Britain 
in the American perception exuded the manifestations of intoler-
ance, naked power, and an anti-democratic form of government vis 
a vis its own people.72 The “founding fathers” knew exactly what 
America went through in the hands of the British crown. Americans 
always abhorred the elite form of British government and the ways 
British society was formed. Illuminated by the works of French En-
lightenment philosophers such as Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Di-
derot, and D’Allembert, America built its own philosophical foun-
dation; namely based on the philosophical works of the French phi-
losopher Baron de Montesquieu, who first conceived the separation 
of the three powers as the democratic form of government; America 
                                                                                                             
 67 American colonies declare independence, THE HISTORY CHANNEL: THIS 
DAY IN HISTORY (Jul. 4, 2015), http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/amer-
ican-colonies-declare-independence [hereinafter American Colonies]; History of 
Brazil: The accident of independence: 1807-1825, HISTORY WORLD, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=888&His-
toryID=aa88&gtrack=pthc (last visited May 20, 2016). 
 68 History of Brazil, supra note 67. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 CLODOMIR VIANNA MOOG, BANDEIRANTES AND PIONEERS 93 (George 
Braziller et al., 1964). 
 72 See generally American Colonies, supra note 67. 
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was born as the United States of America.73 These were the pinna-
cles of the American form of government and the foundation of the 
new great nation.74 
Therefore it would only be natural that the early governments of 
the United States would look at the Brazilian Imperial government 
with suspicion.75 In fact it was the only country in the entire Amer-
ican hemisphere that had, at the time, a non-Republican form of gov-
ernment. Several others countries throughout Latin America were 
also Republics, like the U.S., and Brazil was the only exception in 
the entire American hemisphere. 
In fact, this suspicion had manifested several times throughout 
the first and second quarters of the nineteenth century in attempts, 
directly or indirectly geared by the U.S., to topple the Brazilian im-
perial regime.76 Unfortunately the traditional history books on the 
relations between the two countries have been very timid in reflect-
ing this reality.77 But, there are abundant reliable accounts from the 
Brazilian historians to indicate this unfortunate trend: 
Throughout history, Brazilians in general have al-
ways had a rather negative perception of the United 
States. In 1817, while Brazil was still a “United 
Kingdom to Portugal” (“Reino Unido a Portugal”), 
there was an insurrection sponsored by American 
traders aimed at implanting a Republic in the prov-
                                                                                                             
 73 Brenda Erickson, Separation of Powers – An Overview, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-
state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 
2016). 
 74 Id. 
 75 JOSEPH SMITH, BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES: CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE 12 (Lester Langley et al., 2010). 
 76 Contra id. at 1. 
 77 Id. 
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ince of Pernambuco, that is, to introduce the Wash-
ington plan in Brazil.78 Further, there was not an in-
tention without foundation and plausibility; the in-
surrection had connections with the U.S.79 
On a different historical account, the author established the his-
torical ambience through which Peter I had lived, which only aggra-
vated the situation of mistrust between the two countries after his 
son Peter II succeeded him: 
The relations between the United States and the Em-
pire of Brazil were established in a climate of mis-
trust and suspicion; the reasons resided in the differ-
ences of regimes and the structures of the two socie-
ties. The U.S. considered the monarchical system of 
Brazil as an “anomaly” in accordance with the eval-
uation of Secretary of State Henry Clay. Brazil per-
ceived the U.S. as a focus of subversion. The Em-
peror Peter I ordered the hanging of an American 
sailor, James H. Rodgers who participated in the 
1824 revolt in Pernambuco . . .  The influence which 
the United States exerted was ideological by publi-
cizing its Republican form of government.80 
The historical evidence then finally comes about: 
At the end of 1842 and the beginning of 1843, the 
United States put pressures on Brazil to renew the 
Trade Treaty of 1828 which was about to expire. 
Once again the Americans claimed compensation for 
the capture of the vessels that attempted to flee the 
Pernambuco’s blockade (1824) and the Rio de La 
Plata (1826-28). President John Tyler (1841-1845) in 
his message, actually made threats . . . .81 
                                                                                                             
 78 Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Os Estados Unidos, na percepção do Brasil, 
ORIENTE MÍDIA (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.orientemidia.org/os-estados-unidos-
na-percepcao-do-brasil/. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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In summation, it becomes very evident that the reasons why Em-
peror Peter II did not want to renew the Treaty with the U.S. had to 
do with the Emperor’s fears that the U.S. was plotting against its 
own monarchical regime.82 Of course, that was not in his best inter-
est. 
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY ON FRIENDSHIP, 
TRADE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN BRAZIL AND THE U.S. 
The republican form of government came late to Brazil on No-
vember 15, 1889.83 It was the product of many factors working to-
gether. First, there was enormous discontentment within the military 
with the Imperial government about interference in military af-
fairs.84 Equally, the Church was unhappy with the Emperor’s inter-
ference with religious matters for the same reasons.85 From an eco-
nomic point of view, the situation was not very good; the Imperial 
coffers were low and heavily indebted to Great Britain for the fi-
nancing of the Brazilian war against Paraguay.86 From a sociological 
point of view, both the middle and rural classes were unsatisfied 
with the Emperor for different reasons. The middle class was unsat-
isfied because of its degrading economic situation and progressive 
political influence, namely from Europe.87 The propertied rural class 
was unhappy with the Emperor for the abolition of slavery in 1888, 
a real blow to the farmers’ economy.88 Finally the influence of a 
strong new philosophical movement in Europe (“Positivism”) and 
                                                                                                             
 82 SMITH, supra note 75 at 2, 12. 
 83 Rebecca Duran, History of Brazil Republic, THE BRAZIL BUSINESS (Feb. 
13, 2014), http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/history-of-brazil-republic. 
 84 Brazil: A Country Study (Rex A. Hudson, ed., 1997), available at 
http://countrystudies.us/brazil/13.htm. 
 85 Id; COLIN M. MACLACHLAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN BRAZIL: THE PAST 
AGAINST THE FUTURE (LATIN AMERICAN SILHOUETTES), 33-34 (2003). 
 86 Leslie Bethell, The Paraguayan War (1864-1870), 6, 9 (1996), available 
at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3585/1/B28_-_The_Paraguayan_War_(1864-
1870).pdf (“The financial cost of the war put a great strain on Brazil’s public fi-
nances.”). 
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the works of the Masonry in Brazil all contributed to the demise of 
the Empire in Brazil.89 
The republican form of government has been in Brazil for the 
last 126 years.90 However, it is surprising that throughout these 
years, Brazil and the U.S. have never had a new Treaty on Friend-
ship, Trade, and Navigation.91 The non-existence of the Treaty can 
be attributed to a variety of causes.92 
First, Brazil and the U.S. grew at very different paces and direc-
tions during these years.93 While the U.S. grew into an industrial 
powerhouse in the twentieth century and eventually became the 
world leader, Brazil lagged behind by insisting on a colonial mode 
of economy based on a single commodity (coffee) to obtain its hard 
currency reserves.94 Thereafter, commodities, such as sugar, rubber, 
and other agricultural products were added (especially during World 
War II (“WW II”)).95 Industrialization began with the installation of 
Brazil’s largest steel mill called “Volta Redonda” which was ironi-
cally financed by the U.S. as a quid pro quo for Brazil’s siding with 
the U.S. in WW II.96 
It is very difficult to compile a list of economic privileges de-
rived from a treaty providing for a free flow of goods, tax exemp-
tions, and economic capitalist models between economies of such 
different degrees of development.97 Otherwise, the weaker eco-
nomic party likely reaps fewer benefits than the stronger economic 
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party.98 This has been the Brazilian perception. Once again, the Bra-
zilian perception that the U.S. has been the “Giant of the North” 
ready to engulf the whole country of Brazil has persisted throughout 
the Brazilian republican history99 
However, particularly during the military governments in Brazil 
from 1964 to 24 years later, the U.S. and Brazil enjoyed much better 
relations.100 During the Kennedy era, many great projects were in-
stituted, such as the Peace Corps.101 American private investments 
soared during these years, and the U.S. has become the largest for-
eign investor in Brazil to this date.102 
And yet, during these golden years of opportunity to work out a 
treaty, which could have bridged the gap between the economies of 
the two giants, the United States took no such initiative.103 In 2000, 
President Bush attempted to bring about a new hemispheric trade 
concept called “ALCA,” but once again met Brazilian resistance: 
The idea was that, no matter what government might 
have been, Brazil would have to cooperate with the 
United States and it would have to accept ALCA as 
Washington conceived. Without Brazil, the largest 
economy in South America, ALCA would be irrele-
vant to the United States. Brazil has the most diver-
sified economic structure in comparison to all other 
South American countries: its industrial structure is 
more integrated and competitive which is reflected in 
the quotas of its manufactured products, in its GNP 
and the export of its manufactures (more than 50% 
of total exports) exceeding now the export of com-
modities. The establishment of ALCA, if Brazil par-
ticipated in it would affect the export of its industrial 
goods to other countries in South America. For no 
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other reason, in 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 
leader of the Labor Party (“Partido dos Tra-
balhadores”), a center leftist party, who was leading 
the polls in October, 2002 stated: ‘ALCA is not in 
fact a pact of free trade but a means to annex Latin 
America to the United States.’ That was the public 
opinion in Brazil clearly manifested.104 
The succeeding governments in the last twelve years under the 
Labor Party’s rule only aggravated the tensions between the U.S. 
and Brazil.105 Brazil has clearly distanced itself from the U.S. by 
adopting clear enthusiastic support towards the socialist and com-
munist governments in Latin America.106 There has been an overt 
endorsement of the communist regime in Cuba and the increasingly 
socialist regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia.107 
Brazil has been paying a high price for all of its support to these 
countries, especially to Venezuela and Bolivia. Paradoxically, both 
countries, which the Brazilian Labor Party has supported, have done 
nothing short of taking hostile actions against Brazil and its compa-
nies. Accordingly, Evo Morales, president of Bolivia, ordered the 
confiscation of Petrobras’ facilities upon a military siege on its 
premises.108 Likewise, the Venezuelan government abandoned its 
financial support of another Petrobrás refinery in Pernambuco (a 
state in northeast Brazil); this lack of support caused the complete 
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interruption of works and final abandonment of the project, and ul-
timately resulted in immense losses for the Brazilian oil company.109 
This is all part of a political scheme jointly conceived by the 
Labor Party and Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, which decided to opt for a presumably more “independent” 
position vis-à-vis the U.S. in relation to other nations throughout 
Latin America. However, this contradicts the well-established pol-
icy of the Brazilian foreign affairs office which is to remain neutral 
regarding interactions with other Latin American countries in order 
to avoid being viewed as anti-American.110 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Traditionally the U.S. has been the largest direct foreign investor 
in Brazil by far, accumulating an accumulated stock of about US 
$34 billion from 1986 through 1995.111 Throughout Brazil’s history 
of foreign investments, the U.S. has been Brazil’s top foreign inves-
tor, contributing an accumulated stock of investments amounting to 
18% of Brazil’s total foreign investments, while Spain is in second 
place at 15%.112 The U.S. investments encompass almost every area 
of the Brazilian economy including manufacturing of machinery, 
automobiles, train parts and components, pharmaceutical products, 
chemicals, fertilizers, computer hardware and software, farming, 
and services.113 
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The U.S. is also Brazil’s major trading partner: the table below 
shows impressive data of the U.S. exports and imports to and from 
Brazil within the last 13 years:114 
Ano/Mês 
EXPORTS IMPORTS Balance 
US$ FOB (A) Var.% Part. % US$ FOB (B) Var.% Part. % SALDO (A-B) CORRENTE (A+B) 
 
COBERTUR
A (A/B) 
       
2000 13,189,576,929 0.00 23.93 12,899,226,083 0.00 23.10 290,350,846 26,088,803,012 1.02 
2001 14,208,572,954 7.73 24.38 12,905,492,013 0.05 23.21 1,303,080,941 27,114,064,967 1.10 
2002 15,377,822,589 8.23 25.44 10,287,452,316 -20.29 21.78 5,090,370,273 25,665,274,905 1.49 
2003 16,728,079,047 8.78 22.85 9,569,454,702 -6.98 19.80 7,158,624,345 26,297,533,749 1.75 
2004 20,099,235,400 20.15 20.79 11,357,061,637 18.68 18.07 8,742,173,763 31,456,297,037 1.77 
2005 22,539,731,875 12.14 19.02 12,666,508,176 11.53 17.21 9,873,223,699 35,206,240,051 1.78 
2006 24,524,748,523 8.81 17.80 14,657,479,678 15.72 16.05 9,867,268,845 39,182,228,201 1.67 
2007 25,065,048,412 2.20 15.60 18,723,280,625 27.74 15.52 6,341,767,787 43,788,329,037 1.34 
2008 27,423,048,799 9.41 13.85 25,627,961,850 36.88 14.82 1,795,086,949 53,051,010,649 1.07 
2009 15,601,628,031 -43.11 10.20 20,032,145,355 -21.83 15.68 -4,430,517,324 35,633,773,386 0.78 
2010 19,307,295,562 23.75 9.56 27,044,361,398 35.00 14.88 -7,737,065,836 46,351,656,960 0.71 
2011 25,804,628,156 33.65 10.08 33,970,288,813 25.61 15.01 -8,165,660,657 59,774,916,969 0.76 
2012 26,700,854,915 3.47 11.01 32,362,684,966 -4.73 14.50 -5,661,830,051 59,063,539,881 0.83 
2013 24,653,476,362 -7.67 10.19 36,018,510,576 11.30 15.02 11,365,034,214 60,671,986,938 0.68 
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Brazil has become an important foreign investor in the U.S.115 
For instance, Brazil is the largest Latin American investor in the 
state of Florida and is Florida’s largest trading partner.116 
In 2014, the U.S. investments in Brazil totaled US $113 billion 
while Brazil’s investments in the U.S. totaled about US $16 bil-
lion.117 These are staggering sums! 
All of the figures above show the economic relevance of these 
two countries in the Western hemisphere. It is unacceptable that 
throughout history, these countries, with their large growing econo-
mies, seem to have ignored each other regarding commerce and in-
vestment treaty negotiations.118 The two countries could only bene-
fit by immensely increasing their mutual economic presence, which 
would create thousands of jobs and prosperity in each country. By 
liberalizing taxes and procedures for investments and trade, the two 
countries could enormously increase the above figures. 
Now is the time for these two countries to leave behind resent-
ment, differences, and faulty preconceived perceptions, which were 
exacerbated by Brazil’s unjustifiable paranoia towards the U.S. The 
two countries have more to gain by working closely together than 
by ignoring each other. This article conclusively becomes an exhor-
tation to policymakers of both countries to review their respective 
positions and soon work out treaties in the areas of trade and invest-
ments. While friendship has tied the two countries together for cen-
turies, business should now bring the two countries closer than 
ever.119 
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